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A  major  theme  in  the reindustrialization literature of the early 1980s  is 
the apparent difficulty of  reallocating capital and  labor from "sunset" to 
"sunrise" industries.  Economists  tend to  assume,  without question,  the 
results of  neoclassical  exit theory:  firms exit industries with subnormal 
profits by closing their highest-cost plants.  However,  to  the author's 
knowledge,  this hypothesis has  not been  tested with plant-level data. 
Previous  studies of  exit behavior have  used  firm  or industry-level data and 
focused on  firm size as  a determinant of exit behavior (Franklin,  1974; 
Marcus,  C19671;  Ghemawat,  C19851).  This paper  develops  a test for  whether  an 
industry exits from its highest-cost plants,  using plant-level data from the 
U.S.  steel  industry. 
Exit from a plant is  difficult to  measure  because  barriers to  exit can 
delay a plant closing until the end  of a period of  disinvestment (Caves  and 
Porter,  1976;  Porter,  1976).  In  such  a case,  the production costs of plants 
at time of exit are not directly comparable  to those of  plants that have  been 
continually renovated.  This  paper  avoids  this difficulty and  provides  a 
powerful  test of the theory by focusing on  exit over  time:  the decisions firms 
make  to  avoid reinvestment before closing a plant. 
Neoclassical  theory predicts  little  or no major reinvestment  in  plants to 
be  closed.  The  paper  uses  that prediction to test the hypothesis  that U.S. 
steel  firms exited from the industry by  disinvesting from those  plants  least 
able (given their initial location,  capital stock and  product mix) to compete 
with able minimills and  imports.' 
'This interpretation of steel's recent history as  that of a decli'ning 
industry undergoing exit follows from work  on  the long-run trends  in costs and 
in  demand  underlying the industry's troubles  (Crandall,  1981;  Kawahito,  1972). 
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Since disinvestment is difficult to  calculate,  the paper  examines  firms' 
exit behavior by  studying panel  data on  plant-level investments  in  1960-1981. 
Investment  activity in  plants  that shut  down  is compared  to that of  surviving 
plants  to see if firms avoid major  renovations  of plants prior to  closing. 
Then,  an  investment-decision model  is  estimated to  see  if decisions  to 
reinvest are  influenced by  the relative profitabi  1  i  ty  of plants. 
11.  The  Model 
Specification 
The  neoclassical  prediction for a competitive industry facing a demand 
curve  that has  shifted to  the  left is  that high-cost plants will exit,  leaving 
the low-cost plants to  produce  in the long run.  Exiting plants may  operate 
during the transition period between  long-run equilibria so  long as  doing so 
minimizes  firms'  losses.  However,  a firm  will not reinvest in  an  exiting 
plant. 
Assume  first, for simplicity,  that a plant has  a given capital  stock that 
is  replaced as  a whole.  As  capital ages,  it  requires  increased maintenance  in 
order  to  produce  the same  output,  thus  raising the average  variable cost over 
time.  If revenues  are  stable over  time,  the firm  earns  a declining stream of 
net revenues  from its investment. 
To maximize  the  stream of net returns from the plant,  the  firm  chooses  a 
series of  replacement  times  With revenues  and  costs  constant,  the firm always 
replaces  its capital  stock after t*  periods,  where  t*  maximizes  the difference 
between  the revenue  stream and  the cost of investment  stream.  The  optimal t* 
is  determined  by  the following marginal  condition:  replacement  occurs  when 
the return from the capital in  place  is  equal  to  the cost of delaying 
reinvestment. 
See  Deily (1985)  for details of  the model. 
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capital  costs,  and  salvage values.  Thus,  changes  in  these  variables  will 
alter the timing of  replacement.  In  particular, if  the present value of the 
expected quasi-rent from f.uture investments  no  longer  covers  expected fixed 
costs,  the firm  will continue  to  operate the capital  in  place without 
reinvesting.  This  decision to  delay replacement, if it  remains  unchanged,  is 
an  exit decision since  the plant can  continue operations only as  long as  the 
capital  in  place continues  to  function. 
The  implications of the model  are not changed if the plant is  a series of 
discrete pieces of vertically-integrated equipment,  each  requiring periodic 
replacement.  The  return to  an  investment is  its effect  on the net revenue 
stream of the plant.  If individual  investments  reduce  the average  variable 
cost,3  then the net return to  reinvestment  is the present value of the cost 
savings,  less the new  machine's  cost.  Realization of this return requires 
that the plant remain open  over  the relevant horizon,  linking the horizon of 
each piece of  equipment  to  the decision to  replace  the remaining equipment, 
which,  in  turn,  is influenced by  the horizon of the entire plant. 
If  the plant's expected  total revenue  falls below  expected  total cost, 
then the plant's lifetime is shortened,  thereby  shortening the  investment 
horizon for each  prospective investment.  Machines  will not be  replaced:  as 
soon  as  major  reinvestment  in  any of the pieces of  equipment  becomes 
necessary,  the plant wi  11  close.4 
Total  revenues  are unaffected by replacement  investments as  the two 
obvious sources of change,  a plant's capacity and  product mix,  are held 
constant. 
If possible,  the plant would  be  broken up  at this point,  with continued 
operation only of those  parts that could be  operated for reasonable 
maintenance charges.  The  ability to  segment  a plant would  depend  on  the 
degree  of technical  efficiency involved in  the vertical  integration and  on the 
structure of  the markets  for those  services no longer performed  in-house. 
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could be  lengthy.  In fact, if the salvage  value is  negative the firm  may  even 
continue to  run a plant that does  not cover  variable costs.  Thus,  in 
industries with high barriers to  exit,  changes  in investment  behavior  are  the 
best signal  that exit is  oc~urring.~ 
Ideally,  empirical  support for the neoclassical  hypothesis  would  be  data 
showing that firms'  investment  plans for high-cost plants had  been  revised to 
substitute repairs and  maintenance  for major  renovation.  Although data on 
expectations  and  intentions of firms are not available,  two implications of 
the theory can  be  tested using information on major  investments  actually made 
in  individual  steel plants and  on  the profitability of steel  production at the 
plants. 
First, plants that exit, either during the test period or subsequent  to 
it, should have  a lower  level of  reinvestment  than those plants still open. 
Analysis of  variance is  used  to  test whether  the average  level of  reinvestment 
in  the closed plants is less than the average  for the operating plants. 
Second,  the  leverage  supplied by  the difference in  prospects  among 
differently situated plants during the years  1960-1981  can  be  employed:  if 
firms behave  as  predicted by  exit theory,  then  the incidence of  major 
investments  should vary across  plants in  a predictable manner.  Data on major 
investment decisions  is  regressed on  variables that proxy steel plants'  future 
Salvage  value may  well  be  negative:  one  estimate of employee-related 
closing costs for  steel firms  is  $50,000  per worker.  (Discussion  with steel 
executive,  August  1983.) 
"  The  decision to  eschew  major modernization during exit does  not imply 
that all capital outlays cease  since it  will generally be  optimal  for the firm 
to  continue  incidental maintenance  and  repairs.  See  Lamfalussy  (1961). 
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cost at each  plant each  year.  The  estimating model  is: 
INVAMTj ,  t  =  f(PRICE,, ,  , FMAPRI j ,  t,  PDUM,  INLAND,,  COSTj,  t , 
FMACOSTj,t,  AGE,,,,  SIZEj,  KCOSTt,  PAOCt,  QUOTA,, 
TECHt,  (X FIRM  DUMMYi)j), 
where  J  is an  index  of plants,  1  is the  time index,  and I is  a firm  index. 
Data on  real  steel  prices,  the variables PRICE  and  FMAPRI,  represent  the 
firm's expectations about  future revenues  to the plant.  Since  firms generally 
have  more  information about  future prices than is  revealed by  simple 
extrapolation of  past values,  future  revenue  projections must  be  modeled 
carefully.  One  way  to  account  for firm  information is to  assume  real prices 
follow a random walk  with a trend,  where  the trend is not necessarily constant. 
The  trend is estimated using a simple moving  average of changes  in  steel 
prices for the next three years.  Future revenues  are therefore represented 
with the current level of  prices,  PRICE,  and  the moving  average  of  future 
changes  in the level of  prices,  FMAPRI.  Both  variables  are expected  to 
have  a positive coefficient,  as  increases  in  expected revenues  to  a plant 
would  increase  its expected profitability,  raising the return to  reinvestment. 
Due  to  the lack of  a single good  data-series on  steel prices,  two 
different sources  were  used  to  create the series.  At the point where  the data 
source  changes,  however,  steel  prices jump  upward.  A  dummy  variable,  PDUM, 
controls for this jump  in the data;  it  is  equal  to zero for 1960  to  1970  and 
one  for 1971  to  1981,  and  is  expected  to  have  a positive coefficient. 
'  Perfect foresight is not assumed.  Rather,  this method  assumes  that firms 
know  the average  rate of change  and  can  use  that,  with the current price 
level,  to  estimate future revenues. 
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location-related  effects on expected revenge not captured by the price data. 
In particular, this variable is expected to control for variation among plants 
in  vulnerability to import competition.  The dummy is zero for plants in 
coastal  locations, and one for all others.  It is expected to have a positive 
coefficient. 
Cost data are not available by plant, so several variables capture two 
aspects of plant costs.  First, due to  the importance of economies of scale in 
this industry, each plant's raw-steel capacity, SIZE, is included in  the 
equation.  This variable should have a positive coefficient as larger plants 
have lower costs, increasing their expected profitability. 
Plant costs may also vary due to differences  in local factor prices. 
Data were developed for each plant on the cost of a representative bundle of 
factors used in producing a ton of steel.  Implicit in the construction of 
this bundle is a homothetic Leontief  production function, as the weights used 
to add the factors did not vary over time or among plants.  Although this 
construction ignores factor substitution  (which  does exist in this industry; 
see Karlson  C19831; Moroney and Trapani  [19811, it should be correlated with 
local  variations in true average variable cost. 
Because firms sign long-term labor contracts and are heavily involved  in 
production of iron ore and metallurgical coal, firms are assumed to  form 
expectations about future costs with more information than would be revealed 
in past data.  Thus, the expected factor price bundle is modeled as the 
a  Using plant level output and input levels for the year 1972, Karlson 
(1983) rejects homogeneity, homotheticity, and constant returns to scale for 
fully-integrated steel plants.  But, plant-level  input and output data are not 
available for many years in the sample used here, which is why the factor 
price bundle method of controlling for factor price differences  is used. 
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FMACOST,  the average  change  in  COST  over the next  three years;  both are 
expected  to  have  negative  coefficients. 
In  addition to  expected plant profitability,  a firm's investment  decision 
is  affected by  the cost of capital.  A  variable,  KCOST,  reflects changes  in 
the real  cost of capital and  should have  a negative effect on  investment. 
Finally,  reinvestment decisions  also depend  on  the age  of  the capital 
stock.  In  a contracting industry,  older plants exit first, ceteris paribus 
(Stigler  119661,  pp.191-194).  (This  vintage effect would be  exaggerated if, 
as  seems  reasonable  to  expect,  'younger'  plants were  low-cost plants.)  The 
age  of a plant's capital  stock should be  inversely related to  additional 
investment  in  a declining industry. 
It  has  been  hypothesized that the burden of controlling pollution reduced 
profitability in  steel.  Thus,  the cost to  the industry of operating pollution 
control  equipment,  PAOC,  is included to  control  for changes  in  pollution 
regulations and  their enforcement  over  time. 
A  dummy  variable,  QUOTA,  is included for 1969  to 1972,  the years of the 
Voluntary Restraint Agreements,  and  for 1978  to  1981,  the years of the Trigger 
Price Mechanism.  lo  If these  episodes  of  protection raised the industry's 
expectations of future profits,  then QUOTA  would  have  a positive coefficient. 
The  variable,  TECH,  is  included to  control for technological  change, 
since the availability of  new  innovations would,  ceteris paribus,  increase 
'  In  an  industry in long-run equilibrium,  the opposite relationship would 
be  expected:  a plant with older capital would be  more  likely to  receive 
replacement  investment.  In  a contracting industry,  these plants exit first, 
ceteris paribus. 
'O  Though  the VRA  actually covered  the years  1969-74,  various researchers 
have  found that they were  not binding during 1973-74.  See  Crandall  (19811,  p. 
103  for references.  The  Trigger  Price Mechanism  was  in force during 1978 
through March  of 1980,  and  again from  October  1980  through 1981. 
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late 1950s  and  the 1960s,  including the second  generation hot-strip  mill, the 
basic oxygen  furnace,  and  the continuous  caster.  It  might be  possible to 
argue  that the effects of  the first two  innovations were  felt  during the 
entire test period,  making it  impossible  to  distinguish a sudden  burst of 
investment.  But  this cannot  be  argued  in the case  of continuous casters, 
which were  still experimental  in the early 1960s. 
Given  the difficulty in  determining the year  in  which major  innovations 
became  practical for most  steel mills,  dummy  variables  were  not used. 
Instead,  the growth rate in  output per man-hour  for the  industry proxies  for 
the availability of  new  technology,  under  the assumption  that bursts of 
investment  resulting from major  innovations  reaching an  "off-the-shelf" stage 
of development  are associated  with higher  growth rates of  productivity in the 
industry.  This  variable is expected  to  have  a positive coefficient. 
Finally,  firm  dummies  control  for firm  economies  of scale and  any  other 
firm-specific effects that influence exit decisions.  One  firm  is  omitted,  so 
each  dummy  coefficient indicates whether  there is  a significant difference  in 
a firm's reinvestment level  compared  to that of Armco,  a  'medium-sized'  firm. 
Franklin's (1974)  results suggest  that  dummies  of smaller firms'  will be 
negative while Ghemawat's  (1985)  results suggest  the opposite. 
Data Descri  ptionl 
Data on  43  plants were  collected for the years  1960-1981.  It is assumed 
that steel  firms  obtained new  information  during 1960  that caused  them  to 
reevaluate the profitability of their plants.  Specifically,  they discovered 
that imports,  which  surged  dramatically during the long strike of 
I'  A  handout  describing construction of the data set in  much  greater  detail 
is in  Appendix  A. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copythe previous year,  did not recede  to  their pre-strike levels. I' 
The  43  plants are,  with a few exceptions,  the steel producing plants of 
the eight largest steel  companies  in  the U.S.  during this period.  l3  A list 
of  major  investments made  in  each  plant over  the  test period was  assembled, 
and  a cost for each  investment  was  calculated in  1972  dollars. 
The  cost of each  investment  is divided by  the plant's raw-steel producing 
capacity in  1960.14  Investment per ton capacity corrects for  the positive 
correlation between  plant size and  amount  of investment dollars spent arising 
from the fact that larger plants require larger machines. '  Because  the 
model  focuses  on  the time at which  the firm decides  to  make  an  investment, 
estimated total investment  expenditures are assigned  to  the year  the project 
was  announced  in  the Annual  Report,  as  a proxy for  the point of final decision. 
Steel  prices are constructed for each  plant by combining regional  steel 
prices for eight product groups  (in dollars per ton)  with plant-specific 
weights.  Realized price data was  available for  the year 1971-1981,  but before 
1971  the only prices published in  the necessary  detail were  list  prices. 
l2  The  firms began  mentioning the  'import problem'  in  the early 1960s.  The 
stock market  appears  to have  reevaluated future steel  profits even  earlier: 
in  the late 1950s  the ratio  of  market  to  book  value of steel equities began  a 
long decline relative to Standard and  Poor's  400  Industrials  (Crandall,  1981, 
pp.  28-30).  The  sample  ends  in  1981  since,  due  to  the lag structure employed, 
data were  not available for  later years. 
l3  Plants that exited in  the early 1960s  were  excluded,  as  were  plants  that 
manufactured mostly specialty steels.  Large  electric arc-based mills were 
i  ncl  uded. 
l4 Plant capacity data for 1961-1972  were  not published.  The  1960  capacity 
data is  used  in  lieu of  a complete  set of  capacity figures. 
l5  The  investment  figure was  divided by plant capacity so  that the 
coefficient of the variable SIZE  would  reflect the influence of economies  of 
scale only. 
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COST  is  a weighted  sum  of local  prices for metallurgical  coal,  natural 
gas,  labor,  iron ore,  and  scrap.  Although factor prices are plant-specific 
when  possible,  data limitations prevent plant-specific weights.  Instead, 
weights  developed  for a hypothetical  plant of  one  million tons per year 
capacity are used  to  sum  the factor prices into an  approximate  cost per ton 
for these  factors. 
AGE  was  the net capital stock,  (in 1972  dollars per  ton of  capacity)  at 
the beginning of the year.  The  value of the capital  stock in  1960  was 
calculated using major  investments  made  in  each  plant since 1930,  assuming  10% 
deterioration each  year.  The  stock variable was  updated  each  year  to  include 
new  investment  and  additional  depreciation.  As  in  the case of the dependent 
variable,  the capital-stock figure was  divided by plant capacity  to  factor  out 
the impact of size itself. 
The  variable,  TECH,  is the growth rate in  output per man-hour  in  the 
industry.  As  productivity is  highly correlated with capacity utilization,  the 
average  annual  growth rate over a  five-year period is used,  where  the current 
year  is the midpoint of the period. 
PAOC  is  the cost to the industry of operating all pollution abatement 
equipment  in  millions of  1972  dollars. 
Econometrics 
The  data used  in  the estimation are panel  data assumed  to fit a 
fixed-effects model  where  the sources of the fixed effects are modeled 
explicitly as  follows:  (1)  in  1960,  plants were  of different sizes,  (2)  in 
1960,  plants had  equipment  of  different vintage structure,  and  (3) plants 
belonged  to  different firms,  all of which  effects are included in the 
regression equation. 
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of four variables  that vary only across  time:  the cost of capital,  the cost 
of operating pollution equipment,  the quota dummy,  and  technological  change. 
However,  a second  equation  that includes year  dummies  is  run in  order  to 
distinguish the cross-time vs.  the cross-plant influence  of  the output and 
input price variables. 
Because  of the  incidence of zeros  in  the dependent  variable,  the model  is 
estimated with a tobit specification. 
111.  Empirical Results 
The  relationship between  investment activity and  subsequent  plant closing 
is apparent  in  the mean  investment  per plant per year open  from 1960  to  1981 
for two  subgroups:  those plants that exited during the test period' 
($34.08/ton-capacity  per year open),  and  those  that remained  in  the industry 
($128.27/ton-capacity  per year open).  Using ANOVA,  the hypothesis  that the 
mean  investment  is the  same  for the two groups  is rejected at the 5%  level. 
Table  A  summarizes  the tobit estimation results over  the entire sample, 
both with no  year  dummies  (column  1)  and  including year  dummies  (column  2). 
The  restriction that the year dummy  coefficients equal  zero is  barely 
rejected,  indicating that much  of  what  they capture  is explained by  the time 
series variables included for that purpose. 
The  coefficients of the three variables COST,  FMACOST,  and  SIZE  have  the 
expected signs and  are  significant,  suggesting  that firms'  investments  are 
influenced by cost considerations.  The  inclusion of year  dummies  reduces  the 
coefficients  and  significance of COST  and  FMACOST,  indicating that much  of the 
Ib  Plants whose  exit was  announced  after 1964  and  before 1983  were  included 
in this group.  Exit  occurred when  a plant's steel  furnaces  were  stopped. 
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negative  influence of the factor price variables  is  due  to  variation over  time 
rather than across  plants.  However,  the best estimate of  the coefficients 
still indicates a negative effect of factor prices on  investment  decisions. 
The  significance of the factor price variables is  reduced  by  their 
collinearity with the  steel  price variables.  The  steel price variables are 
poor  proxies for expected revenues:  apparently  steel  prices rose  in  response 
to  higher costs,  as  the  industry repeatedly claimed,  rather  than in  response 
to  rising demand.  Higher  prices thus  signaled lower  output as  the  supply 
curve  shifted back.  As  a result,  the coefficients of PRICE  and  FMAPRI  are 
negative,  rather than positive as  expected,  and  significant in the case  of 
FMAPRI,  as  higher and rising output prices were  a sign of  higher  and  rising 
factor  prices both across  time and  across plants. 
INLAND  functions  somewhat  better as  an  alternative indicator of future 
demand.  The  coefficient of this proxy for vulnerability to import  competition 
is positive and  large,  although not significant. 
The  coefficient of QUOTA,  on  the other hand,  is  both negative and 
significant,  indicating reduced  investment  during the periods of trade 
protection.  Instead of reacting to  stabilized or higher output prices caused 
by protection,  firms behaved  as  if their expectations about  future  profits 
decreased during these years.  The  need  for such  protection may  itself have 
been  the signal.  Together,  the coefficients of QUOTA  and  INLAND  indicate that 
firms  reacted to import competition by disinvesting. 
The  coefficient of AGE  is  positive, as  expected,  suggesting that firms 
are  less likely to  invest in  a plant with smaller capital  stock per  ton 
capacity,  other things equal.  However,  the coefficient is  not significant. 
The  variables QUOTA,  PAOC,  TECH,  and  KCOST  vary only across  time;  the 
effect  of including year  dummies  is particularly strong in their case. 
QUOTA'S  coefficient becomes  positive but not significant.  Without year 
dummies,  the coefficient for PAOC  is negative and  significant,  though  small, 
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control equipment  increased.  PAOC  is  not significant when  the year  dummies 
are  included. 
The  coefficient of TECH  is  positive,  as  expected,  though not significant 
despite the occurrence  of important  innovations.  Possibly the data is not a 
good  proxy for the availability of new  technology.  If  adoption of innovations 
occurs  smoothly over  time,  rather than causing a sudden  elevation in 
investment,  the effects of innovation are hard  to  detect. '  Inclusion of 
the year  dummies  does  increase the coefficient estimate  for  this variable, 
raising its significance. 
The  coefficient of KCOST  is  positive though not  significant.  Along with 
the variable PDUM,  this variable indicates an  increase  in investment  during 
the  1970s,  holding everything else constant.  While  PDUM  was  expected  to  be 
positive,  because  of the upward  jump  in the price-series data,  KCOST  was 
expected  to  have  a negative influence on  investment. 
Both of these  variables  lose significance when  the year dummies  are 
added.  The  dummies  are all insignificant,  with the exception of 1974,  and  do 
not reveal  any  obvious  trend. '  But  the coefficients of  1973  and  1974  are 
positive and  unusually large,  implying a surge  in  investment  in those  years, 
which may  account  for the positive coefficients  on PDUM  and  KCOST.  These  two 
years were  very profitable for  the industry:  imports  fell  and  prices rose as 
worldwide demand  for  steel  increased.  The  industry may  have  revised expected 
demand  upward  during these  years and  thus  increased  investment. l9 
l7  There  is  a large empirical  1 i  terature studying the speed  of adoption of 
new  technology  by  the U.S.  steel  industry.  For  a recent example,  see  Karlson 
(1986). 
Regressions  that included a time  trend and  a squared  term instead of the 
year  dummies  were  also tried.  The  restriction that their coefficients equaled 
zero was  accepted. 
l9  This  result agrees  with Hogan's  description of  firms  as  optimistic about 
future demand  in  1973  and  1974  (Hogan,  1984,  p.  93). 
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Of  the firm  dummy  variables,  the coefficients of  USC,  YSC,  and  BSC  show  a 
significant firm  effect,  indicating investment  levels lower  than Armco's. 
These  results are  interesting,  indicating that firms at the ends  of  the size 
distribution,  whether  large or small,  invested  less than a medium-sized  firm. 
The  model  is  reestimated for two  subperiods,  1960-1970  and  1971-1981, 
both with year  dummies  (table B,  columns  1  and  3) and  without (columns  2  and 
4).  Although the restriction that the two  subperiods followed the  same  model 
is accepted,  the results for the  two periods differ for several  variables." 
INLAND  is negative and  insignificant in the  1960s,  but became  strongly 
positive and  significant in  the 1970s.  AGE  is insignificant in the 1960s;  in 
the 1970s it  is  positive and  its significance  increases.  The  coefficients  of 
QUOTA  and  PAOC  are negative  in  both periods,  but significant only during the 
1970s.  (While  inclusion of year  dummies  turns QUOTA  positive and,  in  the 
1970s,  significant,  the result is  difficult to interpret since  the dummies  may 
control  variation due  to  QUOTA.) 
The  coefficients for the firm  dummies  also change:  while the results of 
the 1960s  mirror those of the full sample,  during the 1970s  the only firm  with 
a coefficient significantly different from Armco  is  USC.  Finally,  the capital 
cost coefficient is  negative and  significant in  the 1960s,  and  positive and 
significant in the 1970s. 
The  steel-price variables continue  to  be  negatively related to the 
dependent  variable  in  both periods,  while the factor prices are not 
significant  in  the 1960s.  Plant size is  positive and  significant in  both 
subperiods.  TECH  is insignificant in  both periods. 
'O  The  estimations  with year dummies  could not be  compared  with this test 
because  to  estimate  the model  over  the sub-periods additional  years had  to  be 
omitted to  avoid singularity.  The  restriction that the year  dummies  were  zero 
was  accepted for the 1960s  and  rejected for the 1970s 
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IV.  Conclusions 
The  evidence  presented here  suggests  that firms disinvest from plants 
that eventually close,  and  that firms disinvest from the  'right' plants,  that 
is, their investment  decisions are influenced by  expected  return. 
Firms  appear  particularly responsive  to  plant size and,  in the  1970s,  to 
plant age  and  location.  The  coefficients indicate that,  in  a contracting 
industry facing import  competition,  firms invest in large inland plants with 
newer  capital  stocks. 
While it  is difficult to sort out the  influences on  investment over  time 
because  of collinearity, it  appears  that investment is reduced  in  response  to 
higher  factor prices,  higher costs related to  pollution control,  and  greater 
import competition.  Further,  it  appears  that the short-term trade protection 
given to  the steel  industry may  have  been  associated with reductions  in 
investment. 
Coefficient estimates on  the firm  dummies  indicate some  kind of firm 
effect,  perhaps  related to  firm size.  The  fact  that during the 1970s  the only 
significant dummy  was  that of the largest steel  firm,  lends  support  to 
theories predicting first  exit by  the largest firms (e.g.,  Ghemawat  and 
Nalebuff,  1985).  However,  the  sample  of  firms is truncated:  the smallest 
steel firms are not included. 
Finally,  the results offer some  interesting hints about  whether  the steel 
industry was  "long-sighted."  A1 though estimates over  the full sample  show  the 
firms disinvesting from  small,  old plants on  the coasts,  such  evidence  is  much 
stronger during the  1970s,  indicating that it  took until then for the firms to 
react strongly to signs of future contraction. 
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contracting industry must  take disinvestment into account.  For  instance, 
measures  of the rate of adoption of the continuous  caster will be  understated 
if the estimates do not adjust for  plant exit." 
Oster mentions  this point with respect to  continuous  casters  in  her 
study of the adoption of basic oxygen  furnaces  (Oster,  1982). 
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Dependent  Variable:  Real  Investment/Ton Annual  Capacity 
Period  :  1960-81 
FIRM 
DUMMIES : 
BSC  (Bethlehem) 
ICS  (Inland) 
JSC  (J&L) 
NSC  (National 
RSC  (Republic) 
USC  (United States 
Steel ) 
YSC  (Youngstown) 







Standard errors in  parentheses.  *Significant at 5%.  ** Significant at  10% 
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PRICE  -.I3  ( .24)  -.24  (.26>  -.08  (.lo)  -.04  ( .lo> 
FMAPRI  -2.07  (1.53)  -3.82**  (2.16)  -1 .I9  (.80>  -1.75*  (.81> 
INLAND  -11.50  (12.57)  -9.59  (12.67)  32.83*  (16.13)  31.23* (15.88) 
QUOTA  -4.07  (32.27)  4889.18 (5434.87)  -30.45**  (16.38)  72.19**  (41.94) 
COST  -1.01  (1.19)  -1.16  (1.28)  -.92  (1.03)  -.43  (1.22) 
FMACOST  1.32  (4.98)  4.82  (5.88)  -3.71  (2.51)  -3.42  (3.21 > 
SIZE  6.70*  (2.46)  7.13*  (2.50)  7.30*  (2.73)  7.24*  (2.71) 
PAOC  -.26  (1.39)  -145.40  (159.88)  -.24*  (.11)  -.59  (.59> 
AGE  -  .005  (.lo)  .006  (.lo>  .13  ( .09)  .17**  (.lo)- 
KCOST  -16.82  (10.70)  -32.26  (27.07)  7.12**  (3.39)  1.56  (8.24) 
TECH  -3.96  (4.01)  -2.38  (8.09)  3.88  (4.38)  17.12  (11.88) 
CONSTANT  94.93  (67.33)  1446.47 (1572.30)  -337.31*  (113.96)  73.65  (57.99) 
FIRM 
DUMMIES : 
BSC  -27.92**  (15.80)  -27.56** (15.85)  -18.32  (15.81) -15.18  (15.33) 
I  CS  -8.20  (27.16)  -7.74  (27.22)  -18.16  (26.66) -11.85  (26.00) 
J  SC  -11.69  (18.68)  -9.98  (18.82)  -10.58  (22.04)  -2.83  (21.451 
NSC  5.78  (17.44)  8.09  (17.47)  -19.02  (20.02)  -12.46  (19.30) 
RSC  -21.06  (16.66)  -19.84  (16.77)  -14.53  (17.59)  -7.76  (17.54) 
USC  -35.66* (14.69)  -35.69*  (14.81)  -32.35* (16.02)  -25.60  (15.60) 
Y  SC  -37.00**  (21.76)  -34.86  (21.93)  -44.77  (31.55)  -37.53  (31.49) 
YEAR 
DUMMIES  NO 
NUMBER 
SIGNIFICANT -- 
YES  NO  YES 
LOG 
LIKELIHOOD -678.82  -676.76  -404.24  -392.50 
Standard errors  in parentheses.  *Significant at 5%  **Significant  at 10% 
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1.  The  Sample 
Data on  43  plants were  collected for the years 1960-1981.  The  plants 
were,  with a few  exceptions,  the  steel-producing plants of the eight largest 
steel  companies  in the U.S.  during this period:  United States Steel, 
Bethlehem,  Republic,  Jones  &  Laughlin,  National,  Youngstown,  and  Inland. 
Selection of the plants to  be  included in  the sample  began  with a list  of the 
steel-related establishments  owned  by  these firms in 1960.  A  steel plant was 
defined as  a plant that contained  steel-making furnaces;  finishing and 
fabricating plants,  and  plants producing pig iron,  were  eliminated. 
Of the plants left in the  sample  at this point, many  were  fully integrated 
from  coke  ovens  through steel-finishing facilities.  However,  some  plants were 
not fully integrated:  for instance,  some  purchased  coke  rather than make  it, 
and  many  plants shipped  part of the  steel  as  semi-finished shapes  to  be 
finished elsewhere.  These  plants were  included in  the sample. 
Also in the sample  were  several  plants using electric steel  furnaces 
rather than open  hearth or basic oxygen furnaces.  Those  plants with a 
capacity less than 200,000  tons  per year  in  1960  were  eliminated. 
In  addition,  a few  steel plants whose  steel  furnaces  were  closed by 1964 
were  also eliminated since their closing was  less likely to  be  a reaction to 
the changes  in the industry's circumstances  focused on here.  Further,  as  this 
paper focuses  on  the production of carbon  steel,  plants primarily devoted  to 
the production of specialty steel,  such  as  stainless  or alloy,  were  excluded. 
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excluded.  This  plant did produce  steel, but used  that steel  to  fabricate 
heavy  equipment,  such  as  tanks,  at the plant.  Some  other plants in  the  sample 
had  fabricating works  but none  as  large and  as  important  as  Johnstown's.  This 
feature  made  it  difficult to  evaluate the plant's expected revenue  and  so it 
was  left  out. 
After the above  plants were  excluded 40  plants remained  in the sample. 
Three other  pl  ants were  added.  Fi  rst the Grani  te Ci  ty  Steel  Company' s pl  ant 
was  included from 1960  even  though it  did not become  a part of National  Steel 
until 1971.  Second,  Bethlehem's  Burns  Harbor  plant and United States  Steel's 
Baytown plant were  added.  These  two plants were  built during the 1960s. 
Burns  Harbor  entered the  sample  in  1962,  when  the first stage of its 
construction was  announced.  Baytown entered in  1965. 
Plants  were  dropped  from the  sample  in the year  their closing was 
announced;  closing was  defined as  the permanent  shutdown  of the steel 
furnaces.  See  table 1  for a list  of plants in the sample. 
2.  Dependent  Variable 
The  dependent  variable was  the amount  of money  firms announced  they would 
spend on major  investment projects in  each  plant each  year.  This involved 
assembling a list  of  major  investments made  in  each  plant over the period and 
calculating their cost by finding  the annual  capacities of each  project, 
finding the cost per  annual  ton of that type of equipment,  and  mu1 tiplying the 
two. 
Data on  investment projects was  gathered from the corporate reports of 
the steel  firms.  The  investments  used  consisted mainly of  pieces  in the  'hot 
end'  of steel  production,  including:  sinter plants,  coke  ovens,  blast 
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Q-basic oxygen  furnaces),  slab mills,  blooming mills,  billet  mills,  all types 
of continuous casters,  and  hot strip  mills.  Also included were  major  rebuilds 
or modernizations  of the above,  plus  investments  at a plant in  raw materials 
handling facilities and  storage facilities.' 
The  boundary of a steel plant blurs when  one  examines  the relationship 
between  the primary plant and  secondary  rolling and  finishing facilities.  The 
line drawn  here was  to exclude  cold strip mills,  tinning and  heat  treating 
lines,  pipe mills, and  wire mills.  Independent  pieces of pollution control 
equipment  were  also excluded. 
In  most  years,  firms included a section in their reports announcing  new 
projects and  updating the news  on  current construction.  Information was 
collected on  the  type of investment,  the plant involved,  and  the year  the 
project was  first announced  to  the stockholders. 
The  reports varied in  completeness  of information from  company  to company 
and  from year  to year.  Reports  ranged  from Inland's detailed description of 
investments  in its  one  steelmaking plant to  U.S.  Steel's inconvenient,  but 
understandable,  practice of simply identifying the area  in  which  a major 
project was  planned or underway. 
In  order to associate investment projects with particular plants in  the 
latter case,  two  directories of iron and  steel  works  were  used:  Iron and 
Steel  Works  of the World  (Cordero and  Serjeantson,  eds.)  and  Directory of  Iron 
and  Steel  Works  of  the U.S.  and Canada  (American  Iron and  Steel  Institute). 
Both these  directories are published triennially,  so  the actual  year  when 
decisions about  capital equipment  were  made  is not known.  However, 
'  A switch from integrated steelmaking  to  electric-based steelmaking,  which 
occurred during the period in several  plants,  was  not counted as  a closing. 
Rather,  this investment  was  considered a switch in technology and  a 
nondefensive  investment. 
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directories'  lists of the equipment  of plants in  the region the corporation 
reported the  investment  for, made  it  possible to  piece  together plant-specific 
data.  There  may  still be  some  underreporting in  the case  of  U.S.  Steel  and 
some  of the other larger firms,  but the investments  included in  the dependent 
variable are big and  thus are very likely to  have  been  announced  in  at least 
one  of the data sources. 
The  list  of  projects was  given a rough  second  check  when  annual 
capacities were  assigned  to  each  investment.  This information was  derived 
from  a variety of sources,  the most  important of which  was  Institute for Iron 
and  Steel  Studies  (19831,  which  included lists and,  in  many  cases,  capacities 
of the major  units of capital in  integrated steel plants.  The  two  steel plant 
directories,  Hogan  (1970),  and  some  other miscellaneous  sources,  were  used  as 
we1 1.  In  most  cases,  the earl  iest pub1  ished annual  capacity obtainable from 
these  sources  was  used. 
The  final result was  a  list  of investment projects,  their capacities,  and 
the year the project was  announced. 
The  data used  to  develop  the cost-per-annual-ton data came  from  many 
sources.  The  sources  differed in  several  ways:  the size of the equipment 
considered,  the year of  estimation,  the number  of  different  types of  equipment 
covered,  and  the type of investment considered,  that is,  new  or replacement. 
At least one  estimate was  available for most  types of investment,  and  for many 
investments more  than one  estimate was  available.  All available estimates 
were  converted to  a dollar-per-annual-ton basis,  then converted to  1980 
dollars (with the construction cost index  discussed below),  and  compared.  In 
some  cases,  estimates  for  the same  unit varied according to  the size assumed 
for  the equipment,  implying the existence of economies  of scale in  capital 
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The  final list  of  figures used  to  calculate the cost of investments  were 
selected from these  various  estimates.  The  actual  numbers  chosen  were 
usually those from A.D.  Little (1980),  unless that figure seemed  out of line 
with the others or unless  different numbers  for different scales  were  being 
employed. 
Finally,  there were  some  investment costs,  such  as  blast furnace 
rebuilds,  that had  to be  estimated  in some  other way.  See  table 3 for the 
final list  of  cost estimates.  A  few miscellaneous  investments  that seemed 
interesting enough  to  register,  but which had  no formal  estimate,  were 
assigned  a cost of  $10 million in  1980  dollars. 
Using the figures in  tables 2 and  3,  along with a cost of  construction 
index,  a cost was  calculated for each  investment project.  The  construction 
cost index  is  published by  the Department  of  Commerce  and  appears  in  the 
Survey of Current Business  under  Construction Cost  Indexes  as  the Department 
of  Commerce  Composite.  This  index  includes residential as  well as  factory 
construction,  but comparison of the  investment  cost figures derived using it 
to  those derived by using the Boeckh  Index for Commercial  and  Factory 
Buildings (which also can  be  found in the Survey of  Current Business),  showed 
little  difference. 
The  index  switched base  years,  from 1972  to  1977,  leaving both series 
incomplete over  the entire test period.  The  1977-base  series was  used. 
Indices for 1960-1963  were  obtained by regressing the 1977-base  indices on 
the 1972-base  indices in  the years both were  available (1964-1976).  The 
estimated coefficients were  used  to fill in  the rest of the 1977-base  series 
from the 1972-base  series. 
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These figures were adjusted with the GNP deflator to remove the effect of 
general changes in the price level, and then divided by  plant capacity in 
1960.  The result is a figure giving the real expenditure per ton of capacity 
announced in the year. 
3.  Independent Variables 
a.  Steel Prices 
In order to estimate a plant's expected product prices, information on 
product prices for four regions  (East,  West, South, and Midwest)  was combined 
with data on the mix of steel products produced by  each plant.  The price data 
was drawn from three separate sources:  two series of list prices for  the 
years 1960-1970, and a third series of  realized prices for the years 1971-1984. 
1971-1  984 
Since 1971, the government has published figures on the quantity and 
value of steel shipped by region and by product group.  These figures appear 
in Current Industrial  Reports:  Steel  Mill Products, a publication of the 
Bureau of  the Census.  Before 1971, only quantity data is available in these 
reports. 
The eight product groups reported, and used in this work, are:  (1)  steel 
ingot and semi-finished shapes, (2) hot-rolled sheet and strip, including tin 
mill  products, (3) hot-rolled  bars and shapes, plates, structural shapes and 
piling, (4) steel wire, (5)  steel pipes and tubes, (6) cold-rolled sheet and 
strip, (7)  cold-finished  steel  bars and bar shapes, and  (8)  other steel  mill 
products, except wire products  (mainly  railroad supplies).  See table 4. 
Price data for these product groups were collected for four regions: 
Northeast, North Central, South Atlantic, and West.  Data was frequently 
available for smaller regions and even for  states.  However, this data was 
often  incomplete since complete information would have revealed proprietary 
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in  about  19  percent of the cases.  The  missing numbers  were  estimated  in  a 
variety of ways.  (About  a third of the estimations  involved using a smaller 
region's figures for the  total region for the product  involved.) 
Among  regions,  the data for the West  was  the worst because  of  the  smaller 
number  of plants.  Among  products,  data for 'Other steel  mill products'  was 
the worst. 
Realized prices were  obtained by  dividing the value of the tonnage 
shipped by the quantity.  For  each year,  the result was  an  8  x  4  matrix of 
prices.  Unfortunately,  the figures included shipments  and  sales of  alloy and 
stainless steels as  well  as  carbon,  so  the prices are higher  than they would 
be if  those products  were  not included. 
1 960-1  970 
List-price data were  used  for this period because  the Census  Bureau 
either did not publish realized value and  quantity of  shipments,  or did not 
publish the data regionally for these years.  Instead,  list  prices were 
gathered for as  many  products as  possible that were  in the product groups 
established by  the Census  Bureau  data.  This  involved using two separate 
sources of list-price  data. 
For product groups  one  through four,  and  six and  seven,  list  prices 
reported in  Chilton's Iron Age  were  used.  Each  week  Chilton's Iron Aqe 
published the list  prices quoted by individual  mills for a variety of 
products.  The  magazine  collected the data from price books,  letters, and 
telephone calls.  The  mills were  identified by  firm  and  city as  well  as  by 
region (East,  Middle West,  West,  and  South)  up  unti  1  the early 1960s,  and  by 
firm  and region from then on.  The  numbers  of  prices quoted  for each  product 
varied by  product and  by region. 
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each  product  covered were  first developed from the weekly  prices in the 
following manner.  (The  same  procedure  was  carried out for each  region.) 
The  weekly  mill reports were  converted  to  annual  regional  numbers,  first 
by finding the arithmetic average  (for each  product)  of all the reported 
prices in the first  magazine  issued each  month.  All prices reported were 
used,  irrespective of whether  the mill was  part of  this paper's  sample.  All 
reports were  weighted  equally,  despite  the variation that existed in capacity 
among  mills.  See  table 5  for the list  of products  used. 
For  product  categories five and  eight,  the prices quoted  in the 
Engineering News  Record  were  used.  The  magazine  got this data from "monthly 
market quotations by  Engineering News  Record  field reporters."  These  prices, 
which were  mill base  prices,  were  quoted by  product and  by  area.  Prices for 
the following products  were  obtained:  reinforcing  bars  (not reported October 
1964  through December  19691,  standard  and  light steel  rails,  standard spikes, 
and  tie  plates. 
Some  information on  the regional prices of wrought  steel pipe was  also 
obtained from ENR.  ENR  quoted  the national  price per  foot of various 
diameters of pipe,  as  well  as  the discounts  from list that were  available  in 
various locations of the country.  These  dollar-per-foot prices were  based  on 
a  do1  lar-per-net ton price of about  $200. 
In  order  to  get an  annual  series of dollar-per-net ton pipe prices for 
each  region,  all the product  discounts reported for each  area were  applied to 
the $200  per-net-ton price and  averaged  together each  month,  and  the months 
were  averaged  to  get an  annual  figure.  See  table 6 for a  list  of  the products 
used. 
The  final result from these  two  sources  was  a  list  of individual products 
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These  annual  product prices were  combined  in  weighted averages  to  get a price 
for each  product group  for each  year.  The  weights  were  developed  from 1965 
data on  product production and  shipments,  and  from  the Wholesale  Price Index 
weights  for iron and  steel products.  These  weights  were  used  so  that each 
product group price would reflect the different importance of the various 
individual products and  thus match  the realized price data of the 1970s  more 
closely. 
In the case  of  new  products,  or of a lack of  prices for some  products  for 
some  regions,  the weights were  altered.  In the  latter case,  this usually 
involved increasing the weight of the most  important product of similar type 
wi  thin the category. 
The  final result of these  calculations was  a four  by  eight matrix of 
prices for each  year  that matched  as  closely as  possible the realized price 
data of the 1970s.  The  eight product prices for the appropriate region were 
then combined  using plant-specific weights  to  form a weighted product price 
for  each  plant. 
Plant-Specific Price Weights 
The  data used  to  construct plant-specific price weights  came  from Iron 
and  Steel  Works  of the World,  1962,  which published annual  plant capacities 
for hot-rolled steel  products and  for other finished products.  One  set of 
weights  was  used  for the entire period since this data was  no  longer published 
after  1962. 
Since  all steel products  (except  ingots)  are hot-rolled,  a  plant's 
hot-rolled capacity was  used as  the base.  All of  the hot-rolled product 
capacity was  allocated among  the eight product  categories.  If the plant had 
cold-rolled or other finishing capacity,  this was  subtracted from the 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyhot-rolled capacity (to avoid double  counting)  and  allocated to the proper 
product  category. 
Since  the Baytown  plant of  U.S.  Steel  and  the Burns  Harbor plant of 
Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation did not appear  in  the 1962  directory,  the 
following product mixes,  based  on other  information about  the mills,  were 
assumed:  75  percent plates and  structurals and  25  percent pipes  and  tubes  for 
Baytown,  and  50  percent  hot-rolled sheet  and  strip, 25  percent plates and 
structurals,  and  25% cold-rolled sheet  for Burns  Harbor. 
Adjustments  Made  For  Different Data  Sources 
Examination of the price-data series revealed a jump  in  prices between 
1970  and  1971,  when  the data sources  changed.  The  basic adjustment  made  to 
correct for this jump  was  to include a dummy  variable in the regression 
equations.  However,  because  of  the use  of  the average  future  change  variable, 
FMAPRI,  additional adjustments were  required to correct for  the large  jump 
between  1970  and  1971. 
A  regression of the weighted plant price on  time was  run for  each  plant, 
and  the estimated coefficients used  to  extrapolate a price for 1970.  This 
estimated price was  used  in  the calculation of FMAPRI  only when  the difference 
between  1971  and  1970  appeared. 
b.  Factor Prices 
Coal,  Natural Gas,  and  Electricity 
Most  of the energy-price data was  taken from a publication of the 
Department  of Energy  prepared by  the Pacific Northwest  Laboratory called the 
State  Enerqy Price System,  and  from subsequent  annual  updates  published by the 
Energy  Information Administration of the Department  of  Energy.  These  reports 
provided state-level dollar-per-million  BTU  prices for:  (1)  natural  gas, 
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and  (3) metallurgical  coal, industrial  sector, 1970-1984. 
Metallurgical  coal  prices for 1960-1969 were constructed  using Wholesale 
Price Index data and information on the cost of transporting coal.  The 
Department of Commerce reports a monthly price and Wholesale Price Index for 
both high-volatile and low-volatile metallurgical  coal.  For each type of 
coal, the monthly indices were averaged to get an annual figure, which was 
converted to a dollar-per-ton price using the proportional relationship 
implied by any one of the monthly indices and prices. 
These two price series were then combined with a weight of 0.8  for the 
high volatile and of 0.2 for the low-volatile, where the weights reflected 
approximate usage  (see  Hogan  El9711 p.  1497),  to get a dollar-per-ton price 
series for metallurgical coal. 
An attempt was then made to include the cross-section variation in price 
caused  by differing plant locations.  It was assumed that the national  price 
created above was the price of  coal  in  the Western Pennsylvania-Northern West 
Virginia area.  (The  area is the source of a great deal of the metallurgical 
coal  mined in the U.S..)  A transportation charge, reflecting the location of 
each plant  (vis-a-vis  the mining area),  was then added to the assumed base 
price. 
The transportation charge was figured by multiplying the type of 
transport miles  (that  is, railroad or ore boat)  by the cost per ton-mile of 
that type of transport, in order to get a transport charge per ton of coal. 
The data on cost per ton-mile for the various types of transport is discussed 
below in the section on iron ore prices.  The distances of plants from the 
mining region were partly based on those used in Gold  (19801, p. 254.  Others 
were estimated by  the author. 
In a few cases of plants located far from the western 
Pennsylvania-northern West Virginia area,  for which a local  coal  source was 
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known,  the national  coal  price,  plus  the cost of transportation from the  local 
mine  was  used.  Plants in Alabama  are a case  in  point. 
Finally,  the dollar-per-ton prices developed by  this method  were  divided 
by  26  to  get a do1  1  ar-per-mi  1  1 i  on-BTU  price. 
Scrap 
Regional  scrap prices were  obtained from the Wholesale  Price Index.  The 
Department  of  Commerce  reports  various regional prices and  indices for scrap 
each month.  The  data on  #1  heavy  melting scrap,  reported since before 1960, 
and  for #1  bundles,  reported since 1962,  were  used.  An  annual  index  was 
calculated for each  product  for each  of five regions:  Pittsburgh,  Chicago, 
Phi 1  adel  phia,  Birmingham,  and  San  Francisco.  These  annual  indices were 
converted into prices using the proportional  relationship of  monthly prices to 
indices. 
The  prices of the two products  were  combined  to  get a final weighted 
scrap price.  The  weights,  0.6  for heavy melting and  0.4  for  #1  bundles,  were 
derived from the relative sizes of these products'  weights  in the WPI.  (The 
years  1960-1961  were  assigned  the heavy melting price by  itself).  Each  plant 
was  then assigned  to  one  of the  scrap price regions. 
Delivered Iron Ore  Price 
The  delivered price of iron ore was  constructed by  adding transport 
charges  estimated  for each  plant,  to the national  iron-ore price.  This 
overestimated the final price because  some  transport charges  were  probably 
included in  the national  iron-ore price. 
For  the years  1960-1976,  the national or base  price for iron ore was 
obtained from the U.S.  Federal  Trade Commission,  The  United States Steel 
'  State Energy  Price System,  Vol .  I, p.  68. 
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International Competitiveness,  as  cited in  Crandall  (1981),  p.  170.  For  the 
years 1977-1984,  a price was  derived from the WPI  indices for regular 
unscreened Mesabi  Ore  and  pellets.  Annual  indices were  obtained from the 
monthly reports and  converted  to  prices.  The  Mesabi  price was  converted  from 
gross  to  net tons.  The  pellet price was  converted from dollar-per-iron unit 
to  dollar-per-net ton,  by assuming an  iron content of 65 percent.  The  two 
price series were  then weighted and  summed  with the weight of  Mesabi  ore equal 
to  0.4  and  of pellets equal  to  0.6. 
The  transport charge  was  constructed  in two parts.  Cost per  ton-mile 
figures were  approximated for railroad, ore boat,  and  ocean  ship 
transportation.  Then,  the distance from mine  to plant was  figured.  The  total 
distance was  divided into parts characterized by  the type of transport  used. 
The  distance on  each  type was  multiplied by  the cost per  ton-mile of that type 
and  the final overall per  ton cost of transportation was  obtained by  summing 
across  types. 
Ocean  Ship Rates 
Ocean  freight rates for coal  were  used  to  proxy those for iron ore.  The 
data was  obtained from the Coal  Trade  Freight Report as  cited in  International 
Coal  Trade  from 1960-1977.  From  1978-1984  the same  data series was  cited in 
International Coal. 
International Coal  Trade  reported freight rates on  various routes once  a 
month.  An  annual  cost per  ton-mile was  calculated by averaging  six months' 
rate data,  taking the lower number  in the cases  where  ranges  were  given,  and 
dividing the annual  cost per ton figure by  the route distance.  Data  for two 
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port  (assumed  Valparaiso).  Ocean route distances were obtained from Table of 
Distances (1943). 
A simple average of these two series was taken to  get a rate for the 
years 1960-1977.  In 1978, International Coal Trade discontinued their 
reporting.  The years 1978-1984 were calculated from tables in International 
Coal, giving only two observations for each year.  Only one route was used for 
these years:  that from Hampton Roads to North Spain  (assumed  Santandar). 
This is clearly a very rough approximation of the cost of shipping iron 
ore, and there may well  be persistent overestimation, since the improvements 
made in ocean shipping were applied more rapidly to the shipping of iron ore 
than to that of coal (Manners,  1965, p. 41). 
Ore Boat Rates 
Figures for ore boat transport costs were derived from data reported  by 
the Interstate Commerce Commission on Class A and Class B  (operating  revenues 
greater than or equal to $100,000)  water carriers of the Great Lakes region. 
For the years 1964-1978 data on freight revenue was divided by data on freight 
revenue ton-miles to get freight revenue per revenue-ton-miles.  For the years 
1960-1963, for which freight revenue-ton-miles were not reported, a freight 
rate per ton was calculated and then divided by  417 miles, the average haul  in 
the Great Lakes during the second half of  1963.  (See  ICC,  July 1964). 
For the years 1979-1984, for which no data were yet available, data were 
generated by  using two different comparisons of railroad, ore boat, and ocean 
ship transportation costs--one mentioned in Manners (19651, p.  174, and the 
other in Gold (1980>,  p. 254.  The average of the estimates derived using the 
two different analyses was used as the ore boat rate for these years.  (The 
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Manners and Gold transport mode rate comparisons are discussed at greater 
length below.  1 
Rai  1  road Rates 
Iron ore and coal railroad rates per ton for the years 1962-1969 were 
obtained by dividing railroads' coal freight revenue by  the coal freight 
carried  by railroads.  To get revenue per ton-mile, each year's rate was 
divided  by  the average haul for that year.  The average haul  was not available 
for 1962 or for 1966-1969; for 1962; the average haul  was assumed to be 296 
miles, and for 1966-1969 it was assumed to be 300 mi les.  A1  1  of these figures 
are from various issues of Coal Traffic. 
Rates for 1969-1984 were figured using the Department of  Labor Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Wholesale Price Index for railroad services.  See Fehd  (1975) 
for description and discussion of this index.  The index was applied to the 
1969 average revenue/ton figure from the coal data, and the resulting rates 
were divided by the average haul figures found in Coal Traffic  (the  1982 
figure  was used for 1983 and  1984).  In the tests, the rates based on coal 
freight were used from 1962-1969, and the rates generated by the BLS index 
were used for 1970-1984.  The two years 1960-1961 were assigned a rate of 
$.Oll/ton-mile. 
See table 7 for the three cost-per-ton-mile series. 
Evaluation of Transportation Rate Data 
The three cost-per-ton-mile series developed here are in line with 
information from other sources on transport rates, at least relative to each 
other.  Manners  (1971)  reported a 1967 rule-of-thumb which showed ocean 
transport rates as 10  percent of the railroad rates and ore boats at about 25 
percent of railroad rates.  In Gold  (1980) the approximation of ocean vessels 
as 17  percent of  railroad rates and ore boats as 33 percent of railroad  rates, 
was used. 
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In order to  find the total per-ton transport charge, information on the 
average distance the ore traveled was required.  First, each plant was 
assigned to an area, e.g., the Ohio Valley.  Based on the figures developed by 
Boylan (1980), each area was assigned a certain mixture of  transport mode 
miles from the major sources of iron ore.  For example, the Chicago District 
was assumed to be 100  railroad miles and 300 barge miles from North Michigan 
mines, 100 railroad and 750 barge miles from North Minnesota mines, etc. 
Information was then collected about each firm's  iron-ore sources, from: 
Hogan (1971);  American Iron and Steel  Institute, Directory of  Iron and Steel 
Works of the U.S.  and Canada, various issues; and Cordero and Serjeantson, 
various issues.  Usually firms had mines in several  different locations. 
Sometimes data were available on the specific source of  a plant's iron ore. 
For instance, the U.S. Steel Corporations's Fairfield, Alabama plant received 
ore from Venezuela.  In cases where there were no other data, plants were 
assigned a mix of output from the firm's  different mine locations based on the 
capacities of the mines.  In this way, each plant had a shipping distance by 
type of transport, attached to it, and the appropriate mix of transport prices 
could be calculated to approximate the cost of transporting iron ore to the 
plant. 
Labor 
The series for the price of labor was derived from data in the American 
Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Report.  The total employment 
cost-per-hour for wage workers was added to the total employment cost-per-hour 
for salary workers.  The two components were weighted each year by the 
relative amount of hours worked by the two groups.  See table 8. 
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Weights  for iron ore,  coking coal,  and  scrap were  obtained directly from 
World  Steel Dynamics  as  cited in  Office of Technology  Assessment  (1980). 
These  figures gave  the unit material and  energy  inputs per metric tonne of 
steel  shipped  for hypothetical plant with a capacity of  one  million  metric 
tonnes  per year  producing plain carbon  steel. 
However,  natural gas  usage  was  reported in  terms  of thousands of cubic 
feet used per  tonne of steel  shipped.  In  order to  convert this to  BTUs  (the 
form of the natural  gas  price data),  data from 1976  on millions of  BTUs  per 
tonne of steel  shipped were  used.  It  was  then assumed  that the per tonne  use 
of natural  gas  was  the  same  in  1977  as  it  had  been  in  1976.  This number,  from 
Office of Technology  Assessment  (1980),  pp.  191,  was  derived from  aggregated 
industry data.  However,  since  the other weights used  (except  labor)  were 
developed for a million tonne  integrated carbon  steel  plant rather than for 
industry aggregates,  this number  was  adjusted to  get a figure of 5.91  million 
BTUs  per tonne  shipped. 
Finally,  some  further adjustments  to  the weights  for coal,  scrap,  and 
natural gas  were  necessary.  Since  the coal  price data were  in  dollars per 
million BTUs,  the coal  weight was  multiplied by  26,  which is the approximate 
number  of  millions of  BTUs  per  ton of  coal.  The  scrap price data were  in 
dollars per gross  ton of scrap;  the weight was  divided by  1.12  to convert  the 
price data to  dollars per net ton.  The  natural  gas  weight was  divided by 1.1, 
which  is the number  of  net tons per metric ton,  in  order to  get millions of 
BTUs  per net ton of steel  shipped. 
The  weight for  labor was  derived from aggregate  industry data reported by 
the American Iron and  Steel  Institute in  the Annual  Statistical Report, 
various issues.  For  each  year  during the period 1960-1984  total hours  worked 
by both wage  and  salary workers  was  divided by net tons of steel  shipped  (all 
grades).  The  annual  figures  were  averaged  to  get a final weight of  10.88 
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The  problem of different technologies was  only roughly corrected for. 
Some  of the information available seemed  to  indicate that scrap-based  plants 
relied almost  totally on  purchased electricity,  while another  source  (Kobrin, 
1968)  seemed  to show  that natural  gas  was  also a very important fuel source. 
It  was  assumed  here  that these plants used  both types  of energy,  and  that they 
used  them  in the same  relative proportion as  integrated plants used  coal  and 
natural  gas.  Thus  ccal  prices were  replaced with electricity prices for these 
plants. 
The  weight  for scrap was  increased  to  equal  weight  for the  iron ore 
price,  plus the original scrap weight.  The  weight  for  labor was  not changed. 
In  the end,  the factor prices represented for  electric arc-based plants were 
labor,  electricity,  scrap,  and  natural  gas. 
c.  Age 
The  age,  or capital  stock variable,  was  constructed in  the following 
manner.  Data on  the ages  of equipment  in  place in  1960  were  collected,  or 
derived,  from Institute for Iron and  Steel  Studies  (1983)  and  various  issues 
of the Directory of Iron and  Steel  Works  of  the U.S.  and Canada.  The  age  of  a 
machine  was  calculated from the year of  decision (rather  than  start up),  so 
the data matched  the dependent  variable.  The  cost of  each  investment was 
calculated using the initial capacity and  1960  capital prices. 
Each  piece was  then depreciated by 10 percent each year  through  1959. 
(The  10  percent rate assumed  a life  of  approximately 30 years;  at that point 
only about  4  percent of the original value remained.  Pieces  installed before 
1930  were  ignored.)  The  values of  the pieces were  then  summed  to  get a figure 
for  the  value of the stock at the end  of 1959. 
The  pieces  included in  the  stock were:  sinter plants,  coke  ovens,  steel 
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hot strip mills. 
Investment decisions made in  subsequent years were added to the stock 
after the year of  announcement.  The sum continued to be depreciated, at 10 
percent, over the 1960-1981 period.  The capital-stock figure was divided  by 
plant capacity to get a real capital  stock per ton of capacity. 
d.  Plant Size 
The plants' 1960 capacities were obtained from Iron Age, March 10, 1960, 
pp. 89-91.  Bethlehem's Burns Harbor plant was assigned the capacity listed in 
Hogan  (1971),  p.  1546.  United States Steel's Baytown plant was assigned the 
1973 capacity listed in Institute for Iron and Steel Studies (19791, p.  13. 
e.  Capital Cost 
The cost of construction index described  in the discussion of the 
dependent variable, was used as the cost of  capital.  The series was adjusted, 
using the GNP deflator, to remove the effect of  general movements in  the price 
level. 
f.  Cost of  Pollution Regulation Compliance 
The data series used is the pollution abatement operating cost, in 
millions of  dollars, covering expenditures for all  types of pollution. They 
are taken from the Census Bureau, Current Industrial  Reports, "Pollution 
Abatement Costs and Expenditures," series number MA200. 
Data were not available for  1960-1972.  Cost for these years was 
calculated as a geometrically declining series  (decrease  of  50  percent each 
year) from the 1973 figure.  The figures  were converted to 1972 dollars with 
the GNP deflator.  (See  table  10). 
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The  growth rate of the BLS  Index of  Output per Man-Hour  in  the Steel 
Industry (all employees),  as  reported in  various issues of the AISI Annual 
Statistical Report,  was  used  to  create this series.  A  five-year moving 
average of the growth rate was  used.  If  the average growth rate was  negative 
(1968,  1975,  19801,  a  zero was  assigned.  See  table 10. 
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1  BSC 
2  RSC 
3  BSC 
4  BSC 
5  BSC 
6  USC 
7  ASC 
8  JSC 
9  JSC 
10  USC 
11  USC 
12  USC 
13  USC 
14  ASC 
15  JSC 
16  RSC 
17  RSC 
18  RSC 
19  USC 
20  USC 
21  YSC 
22  YSC 
23  BSC 
24  ISC 
25  USC 
26  YSC 
27  NSC 
28  RSC 
29  USC 
30  NSC 
31  USC 
32  ASC 
33  BSC 
34  NSC 
35  ASC 
36  RSC 
37  USC 
38  ASC 
39  USC 
40  USC 
41  BSC 
42  USC 
43  BSC 
Lackawanna,  NY 
Buffalo,  NY 
Bethlehem,  PA 
Johnstown,  PA 
Steelton,  PA 
Fairless,  PA 
Butler, PA 
Aliquippa,  PA 
Pittsburgh,  PA 
Dusquesne,  PA 
Braddock (Edgar),  PA 
Homestead,  PA 
National,  PA 
Middletown,  OH 
Cl  eve1  and,  OH 
Cleveland,  OH 
Warren,  OH 
Youngstown,  OH 
Lorain,  OH 
Youngstown,  OH 
Youngstown,  OH 
Campbell,  OH 
Burns  Harbor,  IN 
Indiana Harbor,  IN 
Gary,  IN 
Indiana Harbor,  IN (East  Chicago) 
Granite City,  IL 
South Chicago,  IL 
South Chicago,  IL 
Great Lakes,  MI 
Duluth,  MN 
Kansas  City,  MO 
Sparrows  Point,  MD 
Weirton,  WVA 
Ashland,  KY 
Gadsden,  AL 
Fairfield, AL 
Houston,  TX 
Baytown,  TX 
Geneva,  UT 
Los  Angeles,  CA 
Torrance,  CA 




JSC--Jones  &  Laughlin 
NSC--National 
RSC--Repub1 i  c 
USC--United  States Steel 
YSC--Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube 
Source:  Author 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyTable  2 
Investment  Cost  Estimates 
The  following table lists each  piece of equipment  and  its various  cost estimates.  Each  estimate  is  given in  its  original  terms  and  then converted into 1980 
equivalent  replacement  costs.  The  following conversions  were  used: 
1  year  (y)  E 350  days  (steel  shop)  replacement  -  .9 of new  investment  cost 
=  350  days  (coke  ovens,  sinter plants)  inflation index  I Department  of Commerce  construction 
index.  (See  text) 
=  300  days  (blast furnace) 
A.D.  Little. 
1980 
replacement 
TBS.  1975 
New 
RusselllVaughn 
Crandal 1  . 1968  1968  EPA,  1975  OTA,  1978 
New  New  New  replacement 
EQUIPMENT 
Sinter  plant  10,000  NTID;  $140 mil  (sinter strand)  ----  annual  capi  tal  ---- 
*$401 TY  330.000  TY;  $2.87  mil  cost of moderate 
*$12.56/TY  size ~lant  825lTY 
Coke  ovens  2,500  NTID;  $260  mil  500,000  TIY;  $61.5  mil  500.000  TIY  700.000;  $43lTY  660,000  TIY; 
+$297/TY  +$177.52/TY  $222.5  mi 1  +$111.73/TY  $60  mi 1 
j8507.51 ITY  *$131.22lTY 
Blast  furnaces  10,000  NTID;  $330 mil  950.000  TIY;  $43.47  mil  ---- 
*$I IOITY  *$66.78lTY 
Direct Reduction  ---- 
Unit 
Basic Oxygen  4.1  mil RSTIY; 
Furnace  $190 mil 
+$46.34/RSTY 
Electric Arc  700.000  RSTIY; 
Furnace  $70 mil 
*$1001RSTY 
Continuous  1.6  mil RSTIY; 
caster-slabs  $  100 mil 
*$62.5 
1.18  mil  TIY;  1.18  mil TIY; 
$29.44  mil  $35  mi 1 
+$36.09/TY  +$33.84/TY 
800.000  TIY; 
$30  mi 1 
41  10.881TY 






1.71  mil  TIY;  $55/tonne  Y 
$45  mi 1  *$63.40lTY 
+$37.981TY 
United Nations,  1976  1.71  mil  TIY;  883.1tonne  Y  ----  New  $65 mi 1  -,  S95.7lTY 
1 mi 1 tonnesly;  + 854.811TY 
180  mil DM 
$90.631TY 
500,000  tonnesly; 
150  mil DM 
+$151.021TY 
1.11  mil TIY;  1.11  mil  TIY;  Chilton's Iron 
$  52.96  mil  $62.5  mil  Age,  1965 
+$68.85/TY  *$64.17/TY  $  10 -  151TY 
*$29.5  -  $44.371TY 
(all caster  types) 
$  881tonne  Y 
+S101.401TY 
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Best available copyTABLE  3 
Equ i  pmen t  Source  for Numbers  Used 
Si  nter plant  A.D.  Little 
Coke  ovens  O.T.A. 
Bl  ast furnace  A.D.  Little 
Basic  oxygen  Less  than  l/mil T/Y--TBS 
furnace  (& Q-BOP) 
1  .7-2.5  mi  1 T/Y--EPA 
3-4  mi  1 T/Y--A.  D. Li  ttl  e 
Electric furnace  Less  than 500,000  T/Y--U.S. 
700,000-1  mil T/Y--A.D.  Little 
1  .71  mi  1  --EPA 
Continuous  casters 
(all types)  A.D.  Little 
Hot-strip mills  A.D.  Little 
Bloomi  ng-bi  11  et  mi 11  A.D.  Little 
Slab mill  A.D.  Little 
Mi  11  modernizations:  Increase in  capacity  x  per annual 
ton cost of  replacement  investment 
Blast furnace 
rebuilds:  $161.98/ton  of  capacity in- 
crease  (1  980)  Figure from 
U.S.  Steel  expenditure on 
Gary  furnace rebuild. 
Ore  yard  TBS 
Coal  yard  TBS 
Direct reduction  E PA 
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Best available copyTable 4 
Product Group 
1 
SIC  Category 
331  22 
Description 
Steel  ingot and semifinished 
shapes 
Hot-rolled sheet and strip, 
including tin-mill  products 
Plates, structural shapes and 
pilings, hot-rolled bars and 
bar shapes 
Steel wire 
Steel pipe and tubes 
Cold-rolled sheet and strip 
Cold-finished steel  bar and 
bar shapes 
Other steel  mill  products 
(rails,  wheels, and track 
accessories  > 
Source:  See text. 
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List of Products from Chilton's Iron Age 
Product 




Bars  : 











a1  loy 
Carbon wi de-f  1  ange 
Hot-rolled 






Reinforcing, 1/60 - 6/61  ; 
11/62 - 12/62 
Cold f  i ni shed 
Alloy hot-rolled 
Alloy cold-drawn 





a1  loy 
Manufacturer's bright 
Hot-rol  led 18  gauge & 
heavier 
Col  d-rol  1  ed 
Gal  vani  zed  (hot 
dipped) 
Ename  1 i ng 
Long terne 
High-strength, low- 
a1  1  oy hot-rol  1  ed 
Electrogalvanized 
sheets, as of 7/61 
Cokes, until 10167. 
Electrolytic 
Blackplate and tin 
free steel, as of 
11  167 
*Pr'i  ces reported i  n terms of do1  lars-per-base box.  Conversion used: 
20  base boxes =  1  ton of steel. 
Source:  Chilton's  Iron Age, various issues 
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List of  Products from  Engineering News  Record 
Product  Product Group 
Reinforcing Bars  3 
Rails:  Standard 
Light 
Track  Supplies:  Standard Spikes  8 
Tie Plates  8 
Pipe:  2 112  &  3:,  Black  5 
2 112  &  3", Galvanized  5 
3  1/2 to 6",  Black  5 
3  1/2  to 6".  Galvanized  5 
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Cost per Ton-Mile 
(do1  lars) 







.0009  1 
.00076 











































Rai 1  road 
.0110 
























Source:  Author's  estimates using various sources.  See text. 
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Best available copyTable 8 
Basic Labor-Cost Series, Salary and Wage 
(dollars  per hour) 
YEAR  LABOR COST 
Source:  American Iron and Steel  Institute, Annual Statistical 
Report, various issues. 
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*Weights reflect adjustment for units used in the respective price series. 
See text for  discussion. 
Sources:  Office of Technology Assessment (1980),  pp. 190 - 91; 
American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statistical  Report, 1977; 
and author's estimates. 
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Source:  See  text. 
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